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With the increasing exposure and vulnerability to cyber attacks, it becomes necessary to develop
methodologies and systems that are capable of dealing with the complex and multifaceted nature of
decision situations encountered in security planning and management. In this paper we present the
theoretical basis, architecture and design of a web-based multi-perspective decision support system (DSS)
and an underlying decision multi-criteria decision framework that is consistent with security and decision
theory. The system is illustrated through a multi-stakeholder scenario that captures the complexity
encountered in a multi-criteria security control selection decision problem.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In today's competitive and dynamic business environment,
organizations are increasingly reliant on information technology
for increased efficiency and for securing competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, with the ubiquity of information technology (IT)
comes increased exposure and vulnerability to cyber attacks.
According to the Computer Security Institute (CSI), the average
annual loss reported in their 2008 survey is $289.6 thousand, down
from $345 thousand last year, but up from $168.7 thousand two
years ago [46]. Earlier reports also present a similar picture.
PricewaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. and InformationWeek reported an
estimated $1.6 trillion dollars in damage on the global economy and
$266 billion within the United States [7]. While the surveys
mentioned may provide varying statistics due to the diverse
populations (different countries, sectors and degree of sophistication
about securitymatters) [43], such numbers convey to us a clear signal
that security remains a continually significant issue with growing
organizational as well as economic impacts.
Despite the proliferation of IS security risk analysis methods the
data needed for decision making is not knownwith any accuracy and
it is thus not clear how organizations make security investment
decisions [43]. More importantly, such risk management approaches
acknowledge that “risk perception depends very much on beliefs,
feelings and judgment” [17]. Tools and methods for security risk
planning which rely on techniques that ignore behavioral aspects
cannot account for the multidimensional effects of security controls
[57]. Moreover, the security literature and practice has in the past
decade come under wide criticism from the socio-technical research
community, as being largely technocratic e.g., [64] and functionalistic
in its approach to information security, at the expense of the
organizational aspect [26]. The multidimensional nature of security
awareness [53] precludes, from this perspective, the ability of
traditional security management approaches to consider significant
factors that are not easily quantifiable within their decision making,
and would seem to extend the traditional scope represented best by
the so-called “C.I.A.” paradigm of Confidentiality, Integrity, Avail-
ability [21].
If we are to consider information security as a holistic and
organizational concern, it follows logically that our methods of
management must be able to accommodate this vision. Organizations
which exhibit higher levels of inquiry [8] require tools appropriate to
their level of decision making. Following Courtney [9], decision
support systems must embrace approaches that respond to the
decision styles and complexity exhibited in such organizations.
Moreover, multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) accompanied by
group decision support (GDSS) techniques can meet such require-
ments and thus improve the security decision process in these
organizations.
Within this paper, we develop a collaborative web-based decision
support system (DSS) for security decision making and planning,
incorporating notions drawn from inquiring systems, multi-criteria
decision analysis and group decision making. The Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) is incorporated into a distributed web application for
decision support, and an example of its use in addressing a security
decision problem is given. The remainder of the paper is organized as
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follows: the next section provides a brief review of relevant literature.
We then present the design and development of the system and
follow with a multi-stakeholder a multi-criteria scenario demonstrat-
ing the applicability of the proposed system. We conclude the paper
with reflections and direction for future research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Security planning decision making
Quantitative and mathematical analysis approaches to security
investment and management have been heavily emphasized, e.g.,
[5,20,28], largely from a fiscal, cost-containment perspective. Many of
these techniques draw directly from financial management and risk
management. Examples of such techniques are: Return on Security
Investment (ROSI), common financial measures such as Net Present
Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for evaluation of a
potential security investment, and risk management approaches
based on expected value, an example being Annualized Loss
Expectancy.
These methods are all constrained by the difficulty in quantifying
the probability of a threat to an IS asset, the value of assets, and the
related ISS risk [19,59]. Recent contributions to the security planning
literature have acknowledged such difficulty [7,44,49,59] and have
attempted to provide alternative approaches that reduce the demands
on the data requirements [7,15]. Others have emphasized the
importance that accurate estimation of system risk plays in the
success of risk management [65], yet the analytic models provided do
not offer specific guidelines for obtaining the necessary data.
Regardless of the approach, the data requirements for analysis
continue to prove an extremely difficult task [19,29,33] particularly
as the nature of today's information technology and business
environment emphasizes securing information and intangible assets
which in turn can prove a far more daunting task than quantifying the
value of physical assets.
There have also been substantial arguments for subjective
behavioral approaches. Behavioral security research suggests that in
practice, probability estimates tend to be underemphasized in
importance relative to worst-case scenario [31]. This research
recognizes the role of managerial perception and subjective criteria
(beliefs, feelings, judgments) as major influences on risk tolerance in
information security [40,57,58]. It purports that techniques which
ignore behavioral aspects cannot account for the multidimensional
effects of controls [57] and are often atheoretical [23]. Additional
problems include issues of communication between management
tiers as discussed in [3], often resulting in inconsistency and reactive
policy [18].
There exists a need for approaches and systems that address
decision-making needs in complex situations, such as security
planning, that involve multiple perspectives [12,19,66] and are
frequently plagued by inadequate data andmultiple, often conflicting,
goals. Problems encountered in this context are often referred to
within the literature as “wicked” problems [48] and exhibit
troublesome characteristics, including the following significant
issues:
• There is no definite formulation of a wicked problem — formulating
the problem is the problem.
• Solutions to wicked problems are not necessarily true or false, but
good or bad — values are inherently a large part of the problem and
the values employed vary among stakeholders.
• There is no immediate or ultimate test of a solution to a wicked
problem.
• Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one shot operation”;
because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, thus
every attempt counts significantly.
In attempting to deal with such “wicked” decision situations, any
proposed system should embrace a Singerian organizational model
for inquiring organizations [9] that goes beyond the technical and
reductionistic orientation of most existing approaches. MCDM is
purported as a means for handling goal imprecision and conflict often
encountered in such situations, as we shall elaborate.
2.2. Security planning in inquiring organizations
Churchman's [8] seminal work on inquiring organizations as
learning organizations provides us with a comprehensive framework
for defining intelligence in systems, and thus, for valid approaches to
handling complex problems like those encountered in security
planning. The characteristic decision making for these organizations
may vary depending on their underlying epistemology (or philosophy
of knowledge) [9]. For example, while a normative Leibnizian
(rational) inquiring organization views itself as creating knowledge
by using mathematical analysis and formal logic to make inferences
about cause-and-effect, a Lockean (empirical objectivity) inquiring
organization creates knowledge through observation, and sharing and
creating consensus about these observations. With respect to decision
styles, Leibnizian organizations are analytic in nature, wherein the
world can be reduced to formulas and assumptions, while a Lockean
organization emphasizes a more open and group-oriented approach
to decisionmaking under a similar reductionist paradigm. It should be
noted that most approaches to decision support in the context of
security planning have been oriented towards such organizations and
assume a paradigm characteristic of such “old thinking” [34].
At a higher level of inquiry as it is identified by Churchman,
Hegelian (dialectical or conflict-based) and Kantian (multi-perspec-
tive) inquiring organizationsmay exhibit “complex thinking” decision
styles [34]. In a Hegelian organization, knowledge is created by
observing a conflict manifested as a debate between two diametrically
opposed viewpoints about a decision situation. Such debate may
reflect more than one perspective on the decision problem and has
been found as an effective approach to surfacing assumptions in
strategic planning problems [32]. Groupware and negotiation support
systems have been found to be well suited for this approach [9]. A
Kantian inquiring organization would also recognize that there may
be multiple valid perspectives from which to view and model a
problem, not necessarily in the context of a conflict. The decision style
in such organizations emphasizes the development of multiple
interpretations of data by relying heavily on analytical methods [9].
Mitroff and Linstone [34] go a step further by advocating a “new
thinking” as exhibited in Singerian organizations. In such organiza-
tions, the “world” is viewed as a holistic system. Problems must be
analyzed as a whole, capturing multiple perspectives in their
thinking and decision making [9,30,34]. In capturing multiple
perspectives, Singerian organizations surpass the other forms of
inquiring organizations reflecting only a technical (T) perspective, in
effect using any and all forms of inquiry whenever and wherever
appropriate in the decision making process [9]. Such technical
perspective is thus augmented by organizational/social (O) and
personal/individual (P) perspectives [34].
We find these higher modes of inquiry necessary to a socio-
technical system for decision support as useful approaches to issues
which are peculiarly complex, in that their analysis may require the
consideration of ill-defined problems, heterogeneity of levels of
communication. Highly context-dependent concerns exist where
objectivity is difficult or impossible, and must rely on subjective
judgment (at and above the “Kantian”mode of inquiry) and thus on a
posteriori as well as a priori reasoning. To extend the organizational
system to higher modes of inquiry requires additionally the
establishment of organizational memory [55] by supporting the
collection and aggregation of individual knowledge that is collabora-
tively accepted, [47] and facilitating its timely recall by some
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associative process. The facilitation of organizational learning [51]
requires not merely that existing knowledge, in the form of
conceptual schemas and scenarios, be available, but that such
knowledge actively supports future actions, and thus aids future
decision making.
2.3. MCDM and group decision support
The security decision process as we would define it consists of a
process of eliciting the values, preferences, and priorities of the
stakeholders in the decision, and in understanding how the trade-
offs between potential alternatives will affect the extent to which
the choice made is able to achieve the objective of the decision.
Security decisions made in the presence of multiple, and often
conflicting, criteria (both qualitative and quantitative) on the basis
of multiple stakeholder inputs require the use of methods suitable
to multiple criteria decision making (MCDM). Moreover, MCDM
would seem a natural technique to support the sort of organiza-
tional learning through group collaboration (see [36]) identified
above. According to Stewart [56] (p. 569), “the key philosophical
departure point defining Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM)
as a formal approach to types of problem solving (or mess
reduction), lies in attempting to represent such imprecise goals in
terms of a number of individual (relatively precise but possibly
conflicting) criteria”. In effect, MCDM techniques are particularly
suited to complex decision situations involving imprecise and often
conflicting goals.
Multi-attribute utility theories (MAUT) utilize this notion explic-
itly in the decision process [37]. Utility-based MCDM techniques
imply the existence of a utility function, a statement of an objective
value that can be maximized and objectively measured. Unfortunate-
ly, this “utility function” has proved to be extremely elusive except in
the simplest problems [39], particularly for multi-objective questions.
Practically, we note further consequences in terms of the expected
capability of organizations to utilize such methods. These techniques
entail expert knowledge of objective phenomena. Moreover, the
inability to represent qualitative attributes limits greatly the prefer-
ences we can capture.
Qualitative MCDM techniques would seem to offer us greater
possibilities in addressing these concerns. Their advantage lies in the
ability to rank alternatives relative to one another, without a need for
objective measures [16]. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP),
developed by Thomas Saaty [50], is an MCDM method well suited to
deal with these issues. AHP has been widely applied to a large variety
of problem domains in economics, business operations, and informa-
tion systems. As a technique, AHP facilitates qualitative comparisons
[62] as well as meaningful comparisons given incommensurable unit
measures [25] and can also accommodate quantitative data [50]. The
explicit use of pair-wise comparisons means that trade-offs in
conflicting criteria aremade obvious to the decisionmaker. Compared
to other MCDM techniques, AHP is easy to understand [38]. It is
simple-to-use, intuitive and the details of implementation and
calculation can be hidden without affecting the usability of the results
[6,63], and supports creation of decision hierarchies incorporating
multiple factors of a decision. Moreover, in addition to supporting the
Choice phase of Simon's [52] model of decision making [10], AHP may
support the Intelligence and Design phases [2], as well as the
Implementation through prioritization of activities encountered in a
decision situation [42]. These advantages make AHP a natural choice
as the analysis engine, in combination with group support techniques,
within the proposed system.
In the context of security planning, Bodin et al. [4] illustrates how
AHP can help organizations make an information security investment
decision. In this paper, we advance upon that work in meeting the
needs of inquiring organizations inmulti-perspective decisionmaking
by providing a detailed depiction of the decision space at multiple and
increasing levels of detail, realized as a series of AHPmodels explicitly
representing the interaction of assets, threats, and controls, and in
supporting aggregation of input from multiple stakeholders. More-
over, adaptations of AHP to the support of a group decision making
context have been made [10,35,60]. Our approach combines individ-
ual subjective judgments expressed as preference structures over a
common set of criteria, which we are suggesting to be necessary in
supporting the higher levels of inquiry (in particular Kantian, and by
extension, Hegelian and Singerian) as characterized above. This is
combined with group interaction which may occur before or after the
individual (subjective and qualitative) preferences have been elicited
and collected.
3. System requirements
In facilitating the design of a decision support system to support
higher modes of organizational inquiry, we have identified a number
of key attributes which the literature identifies as characteristic of
these modes of inquiry. We can now deduce a number of require-
ments necessary to support these modes of inquiry (Kantian,
Hegelian, and Singerian) within the proposed system. This corre-
sponds to activity 2 “Define the objectives for a solution” of the design
science researchmethodology as outlined in [41]. These requirements
are:
A) Support multiple stakeholder perspectives (Kantian inquiry)
and subjective perceptions.
B) Capture individual judgments which may conflict or cohere
(Hegelian inquiry).
C) Incorporate means of aggregating these preferences and
evaluating the outcome.
D) Accommodate ill-structured or semi-structured problems
requiring open systems and iterative judgments involving
multiple and often conflicting criteria.
E) Facilitate ‘organizational memory’ through the storage and
recall of previous judgments.
F) Encourage consensus formation through repeated iterations
and compromises.
G) Disseminate approved outcome of the decisions made should
be available to support future judgments and scenario creation.
We now present the design and development of the system and
the underlying decision model in order to meet the aforementioned
requirements.
4. System design and development
4.1. The underlying decision model
The dimensions comprising the security model are comprised of
an asset, a threat, and a control dimension. They are defined as
follows: T is the set of known threats T:[t1, ... , tn] which may impact
a security decision made by the organization. C is the set of all
known managerial or technical controls, C:[c1, ... , cm], which might
form part of a security decision. Finally A is the set of all identified
assets A:[a1, ... , aq] which might be attacked by some set of threats
T:[t1,…, tn], and/or protected by some set of controls C:[c1 , ... , cm].
Identifying subsets of these basic global dimensions is the first step
in formulating an analysis space for eliciting concerns of the
problem domain from stakeholders.
For any given problem scenario S, we can express a list of identified
assets, threats and controls as a set of vectors: VA=[A1, A2,…, An,…, AN],
VT=[T1, T2,…, Tm,…,TM], and VC=[C1, C2,…, Cr,…, CR], (where VA, VT,
VC, are subsets of A, T, and C respectively). The elements (assets, threats
and controls) of each vector, in turn, are the distinct elements that have
been elicited from stakeholders and pertain to the decision situation
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under consideration.We define each asset (An), threat (Tm), and control
(Cr) element in terms of attributes:
An=[PA1, …,PAs, …,PAS], where PAs denotes the sth attribute of An.
Tm=[PT1,…, PTu,…, PTU], where PTu denotes the uth attribute of Tm.
Cr=[PC1,…, PCv,…, PCV], where PCv denotes the vth attribute of Cr.
Next, we can build a representation space for analysis of
comparisons between elements, corresponding to their interactions
with one another. This part of the analysis space is comprised of three
sub-spaces, namely, threats versus assets (MTA=VT×VA), threats
versus controls (MTC=VT×VC), and assets versus controls (MAC=V-
A×VC). Each decision sub-space includes its own unique set of
attributes. For example, elements for asset–threat combinations may
include elements such as “Client information/insider abuse”, while
attributes in this decision sub-space may include a quantitative risk
assessment along with a qualitative assessment of perceived risk or
even an attribute representing perceived impact on public image from
such an incident. Accordingly, MCDM techniques allow the decision
maker to rank and prioritize various asset–threat, threat–control, and
asset–control combinations against their respective attributes. Taking
asset–threat–control combinations next, we can define an additional
decision sub-space to be associated with a set of criteria, thereby
capturing three dimensional decision attributes. Examples of such
attributes include effectiveness of a particular control in protecting an
asset against a specific threat.
Use of this underlying model facilitates thinking about security
problems in a manner that is understandable in operational terms,
and is capable of producing actionable decisions. However, the
implementation of the various levels defined above will be abstracted
away from the user by designing the system around a scenario-based
approach to simplify and speed up the process of using the system.
Efraim et al. [11] recognize the importance of scenarios in manage-
ment support systems. Most notably, scenarios help identify oppor-
tunities and problem areas, provide flexibility in planning, help
validate modeling assumptions, and allow the decision maker explore
the behavior of the system under various assumptions. Moreover,
scenarios can serve as means for capturing organizational memory.
4.2. System architecture
The system is comprised of three major functional areas: scenario
maintenance, MCDM analysis engine, and group preference aggrega-
tion. This connected set of subsystems provides the modular
infrastructure upon which the presentation-level access (i.e., the
user interface) is built, and is supported by database for storing
various scenarios and supporting decision elements. The following
sections briefly describe each of these identified modules.
4.2.1. Scenario maintenance
The system is based upon user creation and ownership of
scenarios, which are designed and administrated by the users, who
may in turn grant other users access to the scenarios as stakeholders,
open scenarios to receive input judgments, examine scenario progress
and publish completed scenario results to the group. The scenario
maintenance module facilitates scenario creation through the scenar-
io editor (see Fig. 3), in mapping chosen elements and criteria to
existing scenarios if possible, and creating unique elements onlywhen
necessary. The user is also able to search through the existing base of
scenarios for particular elements of interest (see Fig. 2), and can
derive a new scenario from an identified scenario if they wish. This
serves to limit greatly duplication of elements (one of the earliest
problems we faced in experimenting with the framework) and
facilitates iterative use of the system through the establishing of
association relations, linking scenarios to one another and reusing a
common base of related assets, threats and controls, as well as
allowing an existing scenario to act as a template for creating a new
one. This addresses design requirement “E” in supporting organiza-
tional memory and knowledge reuse by preserving and drawing
elements from previous scenarios. It also provides basic maintenance
functions and allows assignment of users as scenario stakeholders.
This module makes it possible to abstract the decision framework
details from the user and thus to simplify the process from the end-
user standpoint. Our model for the MCDM decision framework above
delineates a series of analysis spaces corresponding to the basic
operational security notions of Asset, Threat, and Control and
combinations thereof. The scenario maintenance module handles
the translation of these elements into the star schema, generating
relational links between scenarios and reusing existing combinations
held in common between existing scenarios. In addition to abstracting
the process details away from the user, this approach facilitates
efficiency and element reuse in user scenario design through the
association process.
4.2.2. MCDM analysis engine
TheMCDManalysis enginemust facilitate use of the decisionmodel
in a manner which will allow for comparison of alternatives across
multiple criteria, the result of which is a prioritized list of alternatives.
The initial prototype of the systemuses AHP as its inference engine, for
reasons discussed earlier. However, the proposed system could be
adapted to utilize differentMCDMmethodologies as well. Thismodule
supports system requirements “A” and “B”, listed above, in that it is
capable of capturing multiple stakeholder perspectives on a shared
scenario, and can deal with conflicting criteria through the use of a
pair-wise comparison in its preference capturing.
We store the results for both criteria and alternative judgments to
allow us to dynamically calculate judgments from the stored priorities
from multiple stakeholders who are accessing the system at different
times, and to allow for ease of adjustments when performing these
aggregations for sensitivity analysis, as well as allowing for future
integration with other data sources. Storing these judgments is also
necessary in order to support group preference aggregation.
4.2.3. Group preference aggregation
Given the requirements of the system necessary to support the
highest levels of organizational inquiry (Hegelian and Singerian), we
felt that stakeholder feedback should be the prime element for
moving towards a consensus. The stakeholder is able to reject results
if he disagrees with the individual result, and repeat the process until
the scenario is closed to further input by the scenario owner. The
scenario owner is given supervisory access to the scenario after all
judgments have been taken, allowing for sensitivity analysis, as he is
then able to weight stakeholder judgments dynamically and can in
turn see how this affects the final results. He must eventually make
the aggregate result available to stakeholders. To this end, the system
allows the scenario designer to ‘publish’ the aggregate result (see
Fig. 5) and the stakeholders are then able to vote in support of the final
result or to dispute it, possibly even resulting in the scenario owner
restarting the scenario from scratch or abandoning it altogether. It
should be noted, however, that while consensus is desired (and may
be achieved through multiple iterations), it is not guaranteed.
A number of preference aggregations schemes exist in the
literature [1,10,45,50,54]. In this system, we use the weighted
arithmetic mean method (WAMM) for aggregating individual
priorities (AIP). Such method is the only method that satisfies the
unanimity condition (Pareto principle) [45], as well as possesses other
desirable features such as the homogeneity conditions and the
reciprocal property [14]. Regardless of aggregation method, the
scenario owner will need to provide individual participants' weights
(if they are not to be equally weighted). Such weights may reflect the
scenario creator's subjective judgment regarding the experience,
expertise, and knowledge of the individual participants.
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This module fulfills system design requirement “G” and completes
“C” in combination with the Analysis engine, in the ability to produce
judgment based on a multiple stakeholder aggregate. It also facilitates
requirement “D” and “F” in that the scenario creator can opt to allow
users to repeat the judgment process, or can elect to abandon and
restart the scenario altogether, and in that it allows users to vote
against and thus reject the scenario result if they dispute it.
4.3. Using the system and underlying decision model
Based upon the Simon [52] model of general decision making, and
the contribution of Straub and Welke [57] with respect to security
management, the overall decision process will be described in terms
of four basic phases. First, a security problem or need is recognized
(problem/goal formulation, asset prioritization, and threat determi-
nation); second, risk analysis assesses the significance and nature of
the identified problem (solicitation of stakeholder judgments); third,
alternative solutions are generated based on perceived criticality
(selection of control); fourth, the decision is carried out (implemen-
tation). Accordingly, use of the system begins with defining the
decision space and eliciting of stakeholder concerns, through
providing a list of potential issues, polling opinion or collecting
input directly, or through a combination of such methods. This
process gradually builds a knowledge base of elemental “facts” upon
which the analysis space will draw, and fills in the elements of that
analysis space. Comparison of alternatives within each of the
identified dimensions of the analysis space can then occur, as
discussed previously. After stakeholder judgments are taken, they
can then be prioritized by the scenario owner. In a group decision
support setting, the system aggregates the preferences of the
individual stakeholders and presents the information to the scenario
owner. The scenario owner may then publish the results for group
feedback. This is an iterative process of refinement which encourages
the generation of a consensus, to facilitate dialog on the problem area
and/or to re-evaluate the scenario (or even serve to spin-off a related
new scenario for future analysis). The general procedure for using the
system is as follows (Fig. 1):
1. Users examine and can add to the collection of basic elements
(assets, threats, and/or controls) that are drawn upon later in
designing scenarios.
2. A user interested in creating a scenario uses the searchable
knowledge base of archived scenarios, to find previous cases that
used similar elements, and may view the accepted results of the
archived scenario if they are available.
3. The user may elect to derive his scenario from a previous case that
he has located, or may simply begin a new scenario. The system
provides a list of previous criteria from scenarios of the same type,
or allows creating unique criteria for this instance.
4. The user assigns stakeholders (other users) who are then
authorized to access the newly designed scenario and input their
preferences to the system.
5. The stakeholder who is making pair-wise judgments is at their
conclusion able to view the resulting priorities and may opt to
repeat the process if s/he disagrees with the result; otherwise the
preference details are recorded to permanent storage.
6. The scenario creator views aggregate judgments and can examine
judgment sensitivity by temporarily altering stakeholder weights.
7. The scenario creator completes the scenario, opening the aggregate
results to all stakeholders.
8. Stakeholders view the final choice and vote on the final outcome.
5. System demonstration
According to Peffers et al. [41], once the design and development of
the system(artifact) is complete, the next step is to demonstrate the use
of the artifact to address the problem identified earlier as outlined in
Section 3. In this paper, we extend upon earlier work conducted in
consultation with a financial services provider that illustrated the
viability of anMCDM-based approach. In this demonstration,we use the
system to address a complex realistic scenario where multiple model
iterations are necessary to solve a problem, namely assessing risk and
evaluating relevant countermeasures (controls). The scenario is based
on a generic risk assessment process outlined in [27] and highlights the
handling of multiple perspectives and qualitative criteria within the
framework. In this scenario, afinancialfirmneeds to select andprioritize
security controls, andwishes tomake themost effective possible choice
by incorporating the concerns of several groups of stakeholders, to
protect themost valuable assets against themost dangerous threats.We
will involve a variety of functional areas in the decision making, with
different areas of expertise and agendas, and decompose the problem
using a series of models to better manage the complexity of the
underlying decision situation.
There are three primary groups of stakeholders: Executives, who
will be asked to address survivability concerns and monetize assets,
Legal, who will deal with liability issues, and a Technical unit will
address IT/networking concerns. The functional groups will use the
results of these assessments and priorities developed to make a
collaborative control selection decision based on aggregate prefer-
ences from each of the representative stakeholders.
Having identified the primary goal of control (countermeasure)
selection, we begin our security assessment with asset prioritization
by defining the asset sub-space. Since there may already be an
inventory of organizational assets (also referred to as an asset
registry), the scenario owner (on behalf of the stakeholders) consults
the scenario knowledge base, searching for existing asset evaluation
scenarios relevant to current security concerns. The scenario of
concern evaluates a set of organizational assets in three major asset
categories, namely, Information assets: Client information, Intellec-
tual property (a proprietary credit risk model), People: information
technology staff and functional area staff, and Physical assets: data
center and client desktops/laptops. Following Jones and Ashenden
[27], assets are prioritized along the following common criteria:
• Confidentiality: Impact on the organization if the confidentiality of
the asset is breached.
• Integrity: What is the impact on the organization if the integrity of
the asset is breached?
• Availability: Organizational impact if the availability of the asset is
compromised.
The results emphasize Confidentiality and Integrity over Avail-
ability and indicate the prevalence of Client information and Data
center as themost important assets. A selection of threats is also taken
from a comprehensive list given in the latest CSI 2008 survey of
computer crime and security [46]. Threats of unauthorized access and
insider abuse are identified as the highest priority. Fig. 2 provides a list
of available scenarios in the knowledge base.
Following Jones and Ashenden [27] we then proceed to assess the
risk of a particular threat to a particular asset. This corresponds to a
two-dimensional sub-space of assets and threats. To manage the
complexity of the next level of analysis, the scenario owner includes
the two highest priority assets: customer information and data center,
and the two highest priority threats: insider abuse and unauthorized
access, previously identified. Accordingly, this scenario is comprised
of four alternatives corresponding to all relevant asset–threat
combinations. The criteria included in this scenario are:
• Vulnerability: The security weakness that exposes a particular asset
to a particular threat.
• Impact: The cost of the threat compromising the information asset.
• Probability: The likelihood that a particular threat will affect a
particular asset.
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With these assets in mind, the scenario owner breaks down a risk
assessment across these two top-priority assets identified in the
previousmodel, resulting in the scenario of Fig. 3. This scenario will be
conducted in a decentralized manner allowing for individual inputs of
three stakeholder groups, Executive, Legal, and Technical, indepen-
dent of one another and aggregated to examine consistency and
robustness of the decision. We have summarized the remaining
results in Table 1. Executives exhibit Impact (the expected loss or cost
of compromise) as the dominant criteria (shown in Fig. 4), and Legal
views Vulnerability (exposure to threat occurrence) as most signif-
icant. Executive and Legal strongly favor “Client information/Insider
abuse” by their respective criteria structures, followed by lesser
preferences for the two alternatives “Client information/Unautho-
rized access” (favored by Executive) and “Data center/Unauthorized
Fig. 1. System flow diagram.
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Fig. 2. Searchable database of scenarios, assets, threats and controls.
Fig. 3. Structure of the risk assessment scenario.
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access” (by Legal). The Technical group strongly favors the criterion of
Probability (the likelihood of threat occurrence compromising the
given asset). The dominant alternative is “Data center/Unauthorized
access”, followed by “Client information/Insider abuse”. It is reason-
able to believe that Technical personnel, as the people who would be
asked to implement the control, would be most concerned with
common threats, Executives with the possible impact on the bottom-
line of their firm, and Legal with vulnerability of the assets resulting in
liability to the firm.
Table 1 provides the result of aggregating stakeholders' input
under three weighting structures. This reflects a situation in which
the scenario owner may wish to examine alternate stakeholders'
weightings to assess the robustness of the solution. With all
stakeholders assigned equal weights, “Client information/Insider
abuse” and “Data center/Unauthorized access” exhibited the highest
risk. The ranking of the two highest risks were insensitive to changes
in the stakeholders' weightings. Fig. 5 depicts the aggregate results
with equal weightings. The scenario owner accepts and publishes
the result, opening it to feedback by the respective stakeholders to
vote on (approve or reject) the result. In the event that consensus
cannot be reached, the process of preference elicitation can be
returned to.
Having completed asset identification and threat assessment, the
organization is now able to conduct a control selection for the most
prevalent asset–threat pairs identified and prioritized through the
previous stages. A single-stakeholder scenario is created which
involves all stakeholder groups (Executives, Legal, and Technical)
involved in the final decision in consultation with one another in a
group setting, taking a single input to the system based on group
consensus. The scenario organization is presented in Fig. 6. Following
Table 1
Individual and aggregate results or risk assessment with contingent weightings.
Stakeholders Aggregates
Executive Technical Legal Equal weighting 60% Exec 20% Exec
20% Tech 60% Tech
20% Legal 20% Legal
Criteria
Impact 0.658 0.198 0.232 0.366 0.481 0.297
Vulnerability 0.269 0.083 0.700 0.350 0.318 0.244
Probability 0.073 0.719 .0.068 0.284 0.201 0.459
Alternatives
Client information vs. Insider abuse 0.587 0.352 0.534 0.518 0.546 0.463
Client information vs. Unauthorized access 0.226 0.053 0.061 0.056 0.054 0.057
Data center vs. Unauthorized access 0.135 0.461 0.108 0.235 0.231 0.309
Data center vs. Insider abuse 0.052 0.134 0.297 0.191 0.169 0.171
Fig. 4. Results of risk assessment for the Executive group.
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countermeasure theory and Jones and Ashenden [27], the criteria of
evaluation are:
• “Deterrence”: The impact of control visibility in deterring the threat
source from the asset.
• “Protection”: Capacity of the control to eliminate or reduce asset
vulnerability to the threat.
• “Detection”: The ability of the control to recognize the occurrence of
the threat to the asset.
• “Reaction”: Ability of the control to mitigate risk to the asset from
threat instance.
The group strongly identifies “Protection” as the most important
criterion followed in order of significance, by “Deterrence”,
“Reaction”, “Detection”. Based upon the criteria structure, the
group favors “Data center/Unauthorized access/Biometrics”, strong-
ly preferred over remaining alternatives. The system recommenda-
tion in effect is showing a prioritized set of recommendations on the
most effective manner to defend the identified assets against most
prevalent threats specific to that asset, for the control that has been
determined to be most effective in addressing the stakeholder
criteria preference structure. This group feels that Biometrics would
be most effective in guarding the data center from unauthorized
access, while the same control would be very ineffective in
preventing an insider from taking advantage of his position in the
organization to exploit client information, instead prioritizing
“Security policy” and “Employee education” as the most efficient
alternatives. The priority here applies to the entire security triplet
(Asset, threat, control), ranked against one another, so the data is
actionable in a variety of ways — it embeds the most efficient
response to a threat–asset pair, the most significant threats, the
most critical asset, all within the context of the scenario, and
derived from the results of a progressive series of analysis models
which become part of the aggregate judgment.
After the scenario owner closes the scenario to new judgments, the
scenario can no longer be modified or take new consensus results. The
given scenario becomes part of the archived knowledge base, andmay
be used to suggest appropriate scenario elements for future use, as
well as being available to consult for future reference, along with the
final judgment results for each of the individual stakeholders,
allowing the user to dynamically conduct judgment sensitivity
analysis on historical scenarios at a later time, and after the results
have been archived.
6. Discussion and evaluation
Following a design science research methodology [22,41,61] the
paper highlights the relevance of the problem and presents the
theoretical principles underlying the design and development of
the proposed artifact (system). To evaluate the proposed artifact, a
number of design evaluation methods and patterns exist. Exam-
ples include demonstration, logical reasoning, benchmarking,
using metrics, simulation, and experimentation [61]. Evaluation
may involve comparison of requirements (objectives of the
proposed solution) with actual observed results from use of the
artifact in a demonstration [41]. The intent is to demonstrate that
the system is realizable and capable of meeting the requirements
as outlined in steps 4 and 5 of the design science research method
[41].
Fig. 5. Aggregated results of the risk assessment scenario.
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Comparing the objectives set forth for the system in the form of
system requirements with the actual behavior of the system we note
the following:
A. Support multiple stakeholder perspectives (Kantian inquiry) and
subjective perceptions: This is captured in the ability to incorporate
multiple stakeholders in scenarios, and the use of AHP as anMCDM
method capable of supporting subjective/qualitative preferences.
Scenarios in the demonstration relate several functional groups in
two distinct manners: individual preference aggregation, and
group decision. The scenarios give instances of qualitative criteria
such as vulnerability, and difficult-to-quantify criteria such as
Impact for a threat and Deterrence for a control.
B. Capture individual judgments which may conflict or cohere (Hegelian
inquiry): Handling conflicting judgments in trade-offs is captured
in the use of AHP. Preferences for conflicting stakeholder judgments
are captured by the system and available to future inquiry. In
threat assessment, stakeholder preferences varied considerably —
Executives were most concerned with Impact and losses, Technical
group with Probability of threat, and Legal with asset Vulnerability.
When assessing risk, the technical solution of biometrics was
preferred for guarding the data center from unauthorized access,
while policy alternatives were seen as ineffective. On the other
hand, in guarding the intangible “Client information”, policy and
education were preferred as means to alleviate risk.
C. Incorporate means of aggregating these preferences and evaluating
the outcome: The system uses weighted arithmetic mean method
(WAMM) with support for examining alternative stakeholder
hierarchies to see relationships of preference structures and assess
robustness and consistency of the aggregate decision, which can
be applied dynamically. In the risk assessment, independent
stakeholder group preferences were aggregated, and two alternate
weightings were examined to show robustness of the topmost
threat–asset combination prior to the scenario owner publishing
the results. In the control selection, a group working collabora-
tively resulted in favoring security policy and employee education
as the preferred measures.
D. Accommodate ill-structured or semi-structured problems requiring
open systems and iterative judgments involving multiple and often
conflicting criteria: The design of the scenario presents a general-
ized goal (control selection) across several decision hierarchies
and involving disparate groups of stakeholders. The overall goal is
broken down in terms of an iterative set of model involving
different functional groups and areas of expertise, building on the
previous judgments. Independent criteria hierarchies and lists of
alternatives are shown for the models which serve to narrow the
scope of further inquiry to critical elements, within a broad
analytical framework.
E. Facilitate ‘organizational memory’ through the storage and recall of
previous judgments: Past scenarios, e.g., asset and threat assess-
ment can be reviewed and built upon to analyze more complex
scenarios Also, as mentioned in (D), the scenario demonstrates
how the results of prior judgment can inform and limit the scope of
higher-level scenarios.
F. Encourage consensus formation through repeated iterations and
compromises: The system allows stakeholders to evaluate the
results. Stakeholders may use the results to facilitate further
discussion and decide if additional rounds of judgment are needed.
Fig. 6. Results for the control (countermeasure) selection for the collective group input.
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Finally, scenario results are available even for unresolved scenar-
ios, allowing for future introspection as to why the scenario was
unsuccessful, knowledge whichmay inform future scenario design
for a similar situation.
G. Disseminate approved outcome of the decisions made to support
future judgments and scenario creation: The online, web-based
system allows authorized users to see the historical results of
scenarios they have been involved in or managed, which have
closed with stakeholder consensus. The scenario explicitly shows
an instance of how the results of past judgments can be used in
support of higher-level scenarios based on prioritized elements,
and as an indirect learning process where it is the responsibility of
the scenario owner to search the knowledge base for relevant
information and assessment of historical scenario results.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we present a decision support system for information
systems security planning. The system is capable of addressing
multiple perspectives prevalent in inquiring organizations, including
qualitative value judgments. This is accomplished through the
development and use of a MCDM model in a web-based group
decision making environment. In framing security decision making as
an MCDM problem that captures the subjective perceptions of
organizational stakeholders, we establish the foundation of a multi-
perspective approach able to address the needs of inquiring
organizations. The analysis space of asset, threat, control and
combinations thereof gives a structural framework that is meaningful
to security management and facilitates actionable outcomes resulting
from a decision. Qualitative MCDM based on AHP models of parts of
this analysis space allow us to capture subjective preferences of these
stakeholders, and, layered with group support techniques for dealing
with conflict and facilitating consensus as well as stakeholder
preference aggregation, we are able to address the requirements of
such a multi-perspective approach for the inquiring organization.
Through the scenario, we can see the trade-offs in a decision fairly
explicitly through this type of approach. Even within our decision
scenario, priorities become apparent, which affect the final decision
outcome based on user preferences. As a technique for asset prioritiza-
tion, risk assessment and control selection, this approach offers
advantage over traditional techniques such as expected value or
annualized loss expectancy, if the decision entails prioritization on the
basis of qualitative criteria, such as capabilities or properties/attributes of
the alternatives in the selection decision which are value-based or
otherwise subjective in nature. The ability to represent these criteria
offers advantage over checklist-based andmatrix-based approaches and
the systemcandealwith conflictingpriorities.Webelieve it canbeavalid
approach in combination with quantitative techniques, used to weight
the relative importance of quantitative data relative to other criteria, or
simply used in parallel with quantitative risk analysis, and could be
highly effective in forming a convenient summary of stakeholder
opinions on an issue or problem being faced by the organization.
However, while the proposed system provides a foundation for
security planning in inquiring organizations, issues pertaining to
managing the potential complexity of the resulting decision space are
warranted. This may be accomplished by using the rating method in
AHP as well as exploring alternative MCDM methods. Further work is
also needed to explore ways for integrating the proposed systemwith
existing security planning methodologies and approaches in a
complimentary manner. With respect to group support, there are
opportunities to utilize more sophisticated methods of aggregation.
Exploration of the application of some of these techniques is expected.
Further work is also needed for field testing and evaluation of the
proposed system. In this researchwe have demonstrated and evaluated
the use of the proposed system in addressing problems encountered in
security planning. In that regard, we have compared the systems'
functionality with the solution objectives as noted in Peffers et al. [41].
The next step is a comprehensive evaluation of the system in the field.
This can take the formof a single ormultiple case studies that documents
the usage of the system in one or more organization. Alternatively, such
field testing may involve a quantitative evaluation of the usability and
acceptance of the system. An example of such study is conducted by Hu
et al. [24] where they evaluate the acceptance of COPLINK, a web-based
knowledge management system for law enforcement.
There are also issueswith anonymity of user input. There are pros as
well as cons ofmaking participants anonymous at groupmeetings [13].
In that regard, the system guarantees the anonymity among partici-
pants. Individual participants have access to their preferences aswell as
to the group (aggregated results). They do not have access to other
participants' input or preference structure. However, to aggregate
individual preferences in order to obtain the group's composite
priorities, we need to provide individual participants' weights (if they
are not to be equally weighted). Such an approach will necessitate that
the creator (owner) of the scenario be able to set the individualweights.
Bymanipulating the weights, the creator of the scenariomay indirectly
infer the final evaluation of individual participants (criteria and
alternative rankings). However, the creator does not have access to
the judgmentsmade by individual participants.Wehave opted to allow
the creator/owner of the scenario to manipulate individual weights
(as opposed to assuming equal weights) to address some of the
concerns raised in [13], such as to allow the scenario creator to capture
experience, expertise, and knowledge into the decision process. An
underlyingassumption is that the scenario creator is in thebest position
tomake such judgment. Regardless, further research iswarranted in the
efficacy of partially compromising creator–participant anonymity for
the flexibility in manipulating individual participants' weights.
In conclusion, as information systems security encompasses an
ever-greater scope of organizational relevance and responsibility, it
becomes necessary for us to develop decision support methodologies
and ultimately, systems, capable of dealing practically with the
complex and multifaceted nature of the decision making of informa-
tion systems security entailed by emerging notions of a “new
paradigm” for security within the inquiring organization — systems
which, in turn, can aid in facilitating higher levels of organizational
inquiry necessary to deal with this level of complexity. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that the significance of information systems
security will continue to dominate the organizational landscape. The
challenges to meet the expectations of organizations and society as a
whole will continue to be a major concern for security planners and
decision makers. Information system security planning methodolo-
gies and decision support tools will need to continue to evolve if we
are to be capable of meeting such demands as those elucidated in this
paper, and we would suggest that the system prototype presented is
an early step in that direction.
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